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Casenotes

McNeil v. Wisconsin: The Supreme
Court has Another Bout with the Right
to Counsel

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."' Further,
the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona2 construed
the fifth amendment to afford the accused a right to counsel during
police custodial interrogation.' Both the fifth and sixth amendment
rights to counsel have been subject to much debate in the Supreme
Court.

4

The United States Supreme Court discussed the interplay
between the sixth amendment right to counsel and the right to
counsel derived from the fifth amendment, as created by Miranda,
I.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See id. at 478-79 (holding that police are required to give the accused a four-part warning:
3.
(1) The accused has the right to remain silent; (2) anything said can and will be used against the
individual in court; (3) the accused has a right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
present during interrogation; and (4) if the accused is indigent, the accused must be informed that a
lawyer will be appointed for representation). The MirandaCourt required the warning because the
circumstances surrounding police custodial interrogation are likely to induce the accused to make
statements which are incriminating due to the inherently coercive nature of the confrontation. Id. at
469. Hence, the right to have counsel present at interrogation is imperative in order to protect the
accused's right against self-incrimination. hd See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text
(examining the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda).
4.
See infra notes 14-106 and accompanying text (addressing the various problems the
Supreme Court has faced in the areas of right to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments).
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in the recent case of McNeil v. Wisconsin.5 In McNeil, the
Supreme Court held that the accused's invocation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel during an adversarial proceeding does
not automatically invoke the Miranda fifth amendment right to
counsel which would preclude all subsequent police custodial
interrogation.6 The Supreme Court's decision in McNeil resolved
a conflict between the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
McNeil' and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United
8 as to whether the invocation
States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman
of the sixth amendment right to counsel also acts as an invocation
of the fifth amendment right to counsel.9 A resolution of this
conflict was critical to provide guidance to lower courts, as the
scope of constitutional protection provided under the fifth and sixth
amendments substantially affects whether police interrogation can
continue once the accused invokes the sixth amendment right to
counsel. "O
Part I of this Note reviews the evolution of the fifth and sixth
amendment rights to counsel."1 Part II examines the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin.12 Finally, Part
III assesses the impact on criminal procedure resulting from the
McNeil decision. 3

5.
111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991).
6. See infra notes 107-218 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in McNeil). See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1986) (indicating that once a suspect
invokes the Mirandaright to counsel, all police custodial interrogation must cease unless the suspect
reinitiates the questioning).
7.
155 Wis. 2d 24, 454 N.W.2d 742 cert. granted, II1 S. Ct. 340 (1990).
8. 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
9. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2207. CompareEspinoza, 813 F.2d at 123 (stating that an individual
who invokes the right to counsel at an adversarial proceeding is invoking both the fifth and sixth
amendment right to counsel) with McNeil, 155 Wis. 2d at 28, 454 N.W.2d at 746 (holding that
invoking the sixth amendment right to counsel does not constitute an invocation of the Mirandaright
to counsel) and State v. Stewart, 113 Wash. 2d 462, 478, 780 P.2d 844, 853 (1989) (finding an
invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel when the accused requests an attorney at an
arraignment does not constitute an invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel).
10. See infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text (assessing McNeil's effect on the scope
of police interrogation).
11. See infra notes 14-106 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 107-218 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 219-252 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to McNeil, the decisions by the United States Supreme
Court concerning the right to counsel involved two distinct lines of
cases.14 One line of cases can be traced to Miranda where the
Court recognized that the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination afforded a criminal suspect the right to counsel
during police custodial interrogation." The other line of cases
stems from Massiah v. United States 6 where the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment precluded the use of statements
deliberately elicited from a suspect once the sixth amendment right
to counsel had been invoked at suspect's indictment.17 Although
the Miranda right to counsel and the sixth amendment right to
counsel are separate and distinct rights, two recent Supreme Court
19
8
decisions, Michigan v. Jackson and Arizona v. Roberson,
created some confusion among the lower courts as to the
interrelationship of the protections of each amendment, and it was
this interrelationship which the Supreme Court addressed in
McNeil.2 To understand the complexity surrounding the sixth
amendment right to counsel and the Miranda right to counsel
provided under the fifth amendment, it is important to examine the
relevant case law in each of these areas.

14.

See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.

201 (1964).
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text (examining the

Supreme Court's decision in Miranda and the impact of subsequent Supreme Court decisions on the
scope of its rights).
16. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
17. Id. at 205-206. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Masslah
decision).
18.

475 U.S. 625 (1986).

19. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
20. See infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text (describing the Jackson and Roberson
decisions). See generally Howe, Cleaning Up the Counsel Clause: Revisiting Massiah v. United
States, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 93, 103-08 (1990) (pointing to the confusion surrounding the application
of the sixth amendment to the fifth amendment); Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver
of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REv. 975, 976-77 (1986) (illustrating that the
protections afforded by the fifth and sixth amendment are not mutually exclusive and as a result,
suspects often have a right to counsel under both contexts).
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A. Miranda and Its Progeny -- The Fifth Amendment Right to

Counsel
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v.
Arizona 21 that procedural safeguards must be placed on custodial
interrogation to protect the accused's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.22 Although the Court in Miranda noted that the
use of physical acts to induce confessions were not as frequent as
they once were, physical acts were replaced by psychological
means which were equally effective. 3 In order to apprise a
suspect of the suspect's right against self-incrimination, the
Supreme Court formulated what has become known as the
"Miranda warnings." 4 Under the Miranda rule, once the suspect

21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. Id.at 447 (holding that limitations must be placed on police custodial interrogation to
prevent physical force from being used to obtain confessions). See I W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE SE IES § 6.4, at 458-64 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (analyzing
the evolution of the fifth amendment case law up to the Court's decision in Miranda). See also
Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 988 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Miranda called for a
-protective shield" in order to prevent violating a suspect's right against self-incrimination); Loucks,
Initiation: The Emperor's New Test, 53 GEO. WASH. L. lEv. 608, 625 (1985) (identifying tie
Miranda Court's concern with the inherent compulsion in the custodial setting and the need for
protecting the suspect's fifth amendment rights).
23. Miranda,384 U.S. at 448 (citing findings in the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement). The Court found support in police manuals which suggested that isolation was a
principal psychological factor which assists the police in a successful interrogation. Id. at 449.
Moreover, depriving a suspect of any psychological advantage will also assist the police during an
interrogation. Id. The manuals also suggested that interrogation should continue for several hours with
breaks given only for necessities in order to avoid charges of duress. Id. at 451. By keeping the
subject off balance, the police could manipulate the subject into foregoing the subject's constitutional
rights. Id, at 455. The MirandaCourt concluded that custodial interrogation places a heavy mental
burden on the suspect even with the absence of brutality by the police. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.5, at 284 (1985) (illustrating the effects of custodial interrogation upon
a suspect and the ability of the police to extract information from the suspect during interrogation).
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Miranda Court devised the following warning: "The
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed." Id. The MirandaCourt stated that the presence of counsel is an adequate device for
protecting the accused's right against self-incrimination and to ensure that the police conform with
the accused's privilege to remain silent. Id. at 466. See W. LAFAvE & J.ISRAEL, supra note 22, §
6.4, at 467-83 (addressing a suspect's right to counsel under the fifth amendment). See generally
Stoneman, Investigation andPolice PracticesCustodialInterrogation,79 GEo. LJ.710,711 (1991)
(pointing to the Miranda Court's requirement that the police apprise a suspect of the Miranda
warnings or warnings which are similar to those defined in Miranda).
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indicates the desire to have counsel present, all interrogation must
cease unless the accused makes a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of the Miranda right to counsel.'
Subsequent cases have clarified certain aspects of the Miranda
decision.26 One of the most important of these is the United States
Supreme Court case of Edwards v. Arizona." Edwards was
arrested for robbery, burglary and first-degree murder. 28 Edwards
initially agreed to speak to police officers but later retracted his
consent and requested to speak with an attorney. 29 The following
day, Edwards was questioned, without counsel present, and
implicated himself in the crimes."° Edwards' admissions were
used against him at the trial which resulted in a guilty verdict.3"
The Supreme Court reversed the guilty verdict and held that the
admission of Edwards' statements violated Edwards' fifth
amendment right to counsel under Miranda.32 The Court reasoned
that a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be established
merely by showing that the suspect responded to questioning, as
occurred in Edwards.33 Instead, in order to establish a valid

25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel under the fifth
amendment, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." Ik at 475. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (defining the proper test for
finding a valid waiver of a constitutional right as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege"). See also Note, PretrialRights to Counse4 Under the Fifth & Sixth
Amendments: A Distinction Without a Difference, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L..79, 90-91 (1980) (discussing
the Miranda decision and the test espoused in Brewer); Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical
Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L Rnv. 193, 219 (1986) (addressing the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver in order for a suspect to waive the Miranda right to counsel).
26. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (defining interrogation as
questioning that is direct or that is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect"); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (holding that police questioning outside
a police station can be construed as custodial interrogation and requires Mirandawarnings). See also
Markman, supranote 25, at 197-241 (outlining the historical antecedents to the Mirandadecision and
the developments of case law concerning pre-trial interrogation since Miranda).
27. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See Markman, supra note 25, at 239 (identifying Edwards as "the
principal right-to-counsel case drawing on Miranda").
28. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
29. Id at 478-79.
30. Id. at 479.
31.
at 480.
32. Id
33. Id at 484.
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waiver, the prosecutor must show that the accused initiated the
communication.34 The Edwards Court observed that requiring a
suspect to initiate the communication is consistent with Miranda
and its progeny35 since Miranda required all police questioning to
cease once tfe suspect requests counsel.36 The Edwards Court
noted that once the suspect has reinitiated the questioning, nothing
under the fifth amendment would prohibit the police from listening
to the statements since the statements would clearly be
voluntary.37 However, since Edwards did not reinitiate his
questioning with the police, the Court determined that Edwards had
been subjected to custodial interrogation.3" Therefore, the Court
found that the statements made by Edwards without the assistance
39
of counsel were inadmissible.
As a result of Edwards, another layer of protection, which has
become known as the "Edwards rule," 4 was added to the
Miranda decision.4 Simply stated, the Edwards rule requires that

34. Id.at 484-85. See generally Loucks, supra note 22, at 612 (examining the Edwards
Court's requirement that the suspect reinitiate further communication with the police before a valid
waiver may be obtained).
35. Edwards, 451 U.S at 485. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980)
(emphasizing that a suspect who is taken into custody has an undisputed right to silence and to have
an attorney present during interrogation); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (stating that
upon a request for counsel, Mirandarequires all
interrogation to cease); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 101 n.7 (1975) (indicating that Miranda distinguished between the request to remain silent
and the request for an attorney and that interrogation must cease upon request for an attorney). See
also Radek, Arizona v. Roberson: The Supreme Court Expands Suspects' Rights in the Custodial
InterrogationSetting, 22 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 685, 690 (1989) (addressing the Edwards Court's
concern with remaining consistent with Miranda).
36. Edwards,451 U.S. at 485. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 96,103 (safeguarding a suspect's right
to remain silent by requiring police to -'scrupulously honor" this right).
37. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
38. Id. at 487.
39. Id
40. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 630 (1986) (addressing the Court's creation of
the Edwards rule); Solern v. Stumes 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984) (identifying the additional protection
afforded by the Edwards rule).
41. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (stating that pursuant to Edwards,
reinterrogation may only occur if the accused initiates the interrogation). The Roberson Court stated:
Thus, the prophylactic protections that Miranda warnings provide to counteract the
inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation and to permit a full opportunity
to exercise the privilege against self incrimination are implemented in the Edwards
corollary that if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning
without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come
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police questioning must cease until counsel is provided for the

suspect, unless the suspect initiates further communication with the
police.42 This extra protection, added by the Edwards rule, has
affected later Supreme Court decisions involving the fifth and sixth

amendment fights to counsel and ultimately, the Supreme Court's
decision in McNeil.4 3
B. Massiah and Its Progeny -- The Sixth Amendment Right to

Counsel
In Massiah v. United States,' the Supreme Court afforded the
criminally accused the fight to counsel under the sixth amendment
once the suspect was indicted.45 Traditionally, the sixth
amendment right to counsel was intended to protect the unaided
layman from the complexities of a trial, and the sixth amendment
fight only applied to adversarial judicial proceedings.46 The
Massiah court held that once suspects reach the "status of
accused," the suspects are entitled to a fight to counsel at

at the authorities' behest and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of
the inherently compelling pregsures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.
Id. at 681 (citations omitted).
42. Edwards,451 U.S. at 482. See Erickson, The Unfulfilled Promise of Miranda v. Arizona,
24 Amt. CRIM. L. REv. 291, 295 (1986) (illustrating how the Supreme Court interpreted dictum in
Miranda in order to create the Edwards rule). The Edwards decision has been criticized as being
based merely on dicta in the Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda.Id. See also Loucks, supra note
22, at 612-13 (characterizing the Court's decision in Edwards as powerful dicta unexplained in the
opinion); Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 1007 (noting that the Court in Edwards undermines itself
with the interpretation of some of the issues).
43. See infranotes 147-162 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Edwards rule
on the Court's decision in McNeil).
44. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
45. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. See generally Howe, supra note 20, at 93-95 (describing how
the Massiah decision increased the scope of protection of the sixth amendment from adversarial
proceedings to situations where little confrontation against a prosecutor occurs).
46. See Howe, supra note 20, at 99-101 (stating that the confrontation between the accused
and the prosecutor has been labeled unequal and unfair, thus the purpose of the sixth amendment is
to equalize this adversarial imbalance); Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 987 (indicating that the sixth
amendment right to counsel attaches only "'toinstances of governmental conduct that pose cognizable
risks to the goal of adversarial equality"). See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45
(1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932) (illustrating that the sixth amendment right to counsel was traditionally afforded in adversarial
proceedings in order to protect the unaided laymen against the complexities of trial).
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confrontations with the state government.47 Expanding the
traditional view that the sixth amendment right to counsel is strictly
applicable only in judicial proceedings, the Court in Massiah
determined that the sixth amendment protection included
confrontations outside the courtroom.4" Having once increased the
scope of protection provided by the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the Supreme Court had to revisit the Massiah decision to
define the scope of the sixth amendment protection in a multitude
of extrajudicial settings.4 9
In United States v. Henry,5" the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the use of government informants in extrajudicial
settings violated the sixth amendment right to counsel.5 Henry
had been arrested, indicted and imprisoned for bank robbery.52
The inmate who shared a cell with Henry was a government
informant who testified at Henry's trial.5" The informant testified
as to statements Henry made while in prison regarding the armed
robbery of the bank.54 The Henry Court reasoned that the nature

47. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205. Massiah defined the status of an accused as spanning from
arraignment through trial. Id The Massiah Court noted that the accused's need for counsel from the
period of arraignment to the beginning of trial is as great as the accused's need for counsel during
trial. Id After the indictment, any interrogation without the assistance of counsel contravenes fairness
in the criminal case. Id
48. Id at 204. The Masslah Court adopted the views espoused by the concurring Justices in
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Id See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324-27 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(indicating that an accused may be denied effective representation if the suspect is denied counsel
before trial but after the indictment). In Spano, the Court found that allowing the police to produce
vital evidence in the form of a confession without the presence of counsel would effectively deny
the accused's right to counsel under the sixth amendment. Id at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring), The
Court in Spano questioned the effectiveness of having a right to counsel at every critical stage if
suspects can be questioned until they confess prior to providing the suspect with counsel's assistance.
Id (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court in Massiah accepted the argument that the status of the
defendant changed from "'suspect" to "'accused" once the suspect is indicted, even if no custodial
interrogation is involved. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 260. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 23, §
6.4 (explaining the Massiah Court's adoption of the argument that the suspect becomes the
"accused' once the suspect is indicted).
49. See Howe, supranote 20, at 95 (indicating that the majority of the sixth amendment right
to counsel cases involve the use of undercover government agents). See also infra notes 50-69 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of government informants in Henry and Moulton).
50. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
51. Id at 270.
52. Id at 265-66.
53. Id at 267.
54. Id
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of confinement may elicit information from an individual which an
accused would not reveal to a known government agent.55
Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the statements made
by Henry were deliberately elicited by the government's use of an
agent in a custodial setting." Although the incriminating
statements were not obtained through the use of affirmative
conduct by the police, the Henry Court held that the statements
were inadmissible because the police created a situation likely to
induce incriminating statements.57
Another post-Edwards case requiring the Supreme Court to
assess the constitutionality of police questioning in extrajudicial
settings was Maine v. Moulton.

58

The Moulton Court was

concerned with the admissibility of extrajudicial statements59
obtained by the police through a codefendant of the suspect.
Colson, a codefendant of Moulton in an automobile theft, confessed
to police officers and agreed to testify against Moulton at trial if no
further charges were brought against Colson.' Colson agreed to

55. Id. at 274. The Supreme Court distinguished the use of government informants in the
context of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 272. A suspect is not protected under the fourth
amendment because the fourth amendment does not protect a party's belief that the party's statements
will not be revealed by the person to whom the suspect confides. Id Similarly, under the fifth
amendment, the absence of compulsion prevents the suspect from claiming fifth amendment
protection. Id The Supreme Court indicated that the fourth and fifth amendment holdings are not
relevant in the sixth amendment context. Id, Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)
(maintaining that the fourth amendment does not protect a suspect's "misplaced belief that a person
to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it"); Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct.
2394, 2398 (1990) (holding that "Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about
their criminal activities in front of their cellmates").
56. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. The Court also noted that the conversations were facilitated
because each cellmate shared a common plight and there was evidence that the informant had gained
Henry's confidence since Henry had solicited the informant to participate in an escape plan. Id.
57. Id Although the informant was told not to initiate the conversation with Henry, the Court
rejected this argument, finding that, because the informant's payment was contingent on obtaining
information, the government must have known that the informant would take steps to secure
information against Henry. Ia at 270-71. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 280
(describing the holding of the Supreme Court in Henry).
58. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
59. Id. at 167-68.
60. Id at 162-63. The police agreed not to bring any additional charges against Colson as long
as the codefendant would cooperate in the prosecution of Moulton. Id. at 163. As a result of his
cooperation with the authorities, Colson was sentenced to two years imprisonment and all but 15 days
were suspended. Id. at 163 n.2.
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wear a recording device at a meeting with Moulton, after the police
had learned from tape recorded telephone conversations between
Colson and Moulton that the two were planning a defense strategy
for the upcoming trial.6" At the meeting, Moulton made
incriminating
statements which were used to convict Moulton at
62
trial.
Moulton appealed the conviction on the grounds that admitting
the statements into evidence violated his sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel.63 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine '4 held that the statements made by Moulton to the
confidential informant, Colson, were inadmissible under the sixth
amendment because the State knew or should have known that
Moulton would make incriminating statements regarding crimes to
which charges were pending.6'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the statements
inadmissable, affirming the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine." The United States Supreme Court refused to
distinguish Massiah and Henry from Moulton merely because the
police initiated the questioning in Massiah and Henry while
Moulton initiated the communication with the informant Colson. 67
The Moulton Court concluded that when the government created a
situation where a suspect is likely to make incriminating statements
without the presence of counsel, the suspect's sixth amendment

61. Id. at 163-65. According to Colson, Moulton had proposed killing a state's witness. Id.
at 162.
62. Id at 165, 167. Moulton and Colson discussed creating false alibis, and Colson elicited
other statements from Moulton relating to the theft of a truck. Id. at 165-66.
63. Id. at 167.
64. State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d. 155 (Me. 1984), cert. granted,469 U.S. 1206 (1985).
65. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine indicated that the
statements could be used in the investigation or prosecution of charges in which adversarial
proceedings had not begun. Id Since the sixth amendment right to counsel had attached for the theft
charges, the statements made to Colson by Moulton were inadmissible. Id
66. Id at 180.
67. Id. at 174. The Supreme Court indicated that the identity of the party who initiated the
conversation was not controlling in either Massiah or Henry. Id. In Henry, the Court had found it
irrelevant that in Massiah, the agent had to arrange the meeting between Massiah and his
codefendant, while the agents in Henry already had an undercover informant in close proximity to
the suspect. Id at 175.
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right to counsel is violated.68 The Court found that Moulton was
denied his sixth amendment right to counsel because the police
concealed the fact that Colson was a government agent. 69
Beginning with Massiah,the Supreme Court gradually extended
the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel to encompass
proceedings outside of the trial setting."0 The Moulton decision,

which held that creating a situation which is likely to elicit
incriminating statements from a suspect violates the sixth
amendment, exemplifies the Court's greatest departure from the
traditional protection afforded by the sixth amendment right to
counsel.7 ' Increasing the scope of protection of the sixth
amendment to encompass extrajudicial settings created some
confusion when the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel
were considered in a single context.72 As a result of this
confusion, further elucidations by the Supreme Court were required
in this area of constitutional criminal law.
C. Setting the Stage for McNeil
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the scope of protection
of the fifth and sixth amendments in Michigan v. Jackson73 and
Arizona v. Roberson.74 In Jackson, the defendant, Jackson,
requested and received counsel at his arraignment on charges for
murder.75 The following day, Jackson was questioned by police
officers before having the opportunity to speak with his attorney.76
After being given the Miranda warnings, Jackson waived his fifth

68. Id at 174.
69. L at 179-80.
70. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in Massiah).
71. See supranotes 44-69 and accompanying text (examining the scope of the right to counsel
afforded under the sixth amendment).
72. See infra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (analyzing the interplay between the fifth
and sixth amendment rights to counsel and the difficulty the Supreme Court has encountered in
defining these rights).
73. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
74. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
75. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 628.
76. Id.
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amendment right to counsel.7 7 The statements elicited from
Jackson during the interrogation were admitted at trial and
consequently, Jackson was convicted of murder and conspiracy to
commit second-degree murder.78
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue of whether Jackson's waiver of the fifth amendment
right to counsel constituted a valid waiver once the right to counsel
had been invoked at the arraignment.79 The Supreme Court held
that once the suspect invoked the sixth amendment right to counsel,
any subsequent waiver of that right to counsel is insufficient unless
the accused initiates the questioning." The Jackson Court
indicated that the right to counsel originated from two sources: the
fifth amendment right to counsel which protects against compelled
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, and the sixth
amendment guarantee which provides counsel during postarraignment confrontations. 8 In effect, the Supreme Court held
that the Edwards rule, requiring a suspect to reinitiate questioning
with the police once the fifth amendment right to counsel is
invoked, would apply to the sixth amendment right to counsel as
82
well.
In Jackson, the State argued that the Edwards rule should not
apply because the relevance of the legal principles underlying the
83
fifth amendment is questionable in a sixth amendment context.

77. Id
78. Id at 627-28.
79. Id at 630.
80. Id at 636.
81. Id at 629. The Court identified the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and
the sixth amendment right to counsel at post-arraignment interrogation by police as two sources for
an accused's right to counsel. Id
82. Id at 632. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981) (requiring the police to
discontinue custodial interrogation once the suspect requests the Mirandaright to counsel unless the
suspect reinitiates communications with the police officers). See also supra notes 27-43 and
accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's expansion on the Miranda decision through the
creation of the Edwards rule).
83. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631. The State contended that the Edwards rule applies to custodial
interrogation under the fifth amendment, and that it would be improper to apply the Edwards rule
to the sixth amendment because its relevance was not clear. Id In addition, the State urged the
inapplicability of the Edwards rule because there were factual and legal differences in the basis for
fifth and sixth amendment claims, and the suspect had signed valid waivers of the right to counsel
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The State also argued that a suspect's request for counsel at an
arraignment may not be intended to encompass a request for
counsel during custodial interrogation of the suspect.8 4 The
Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded by the State's
arguments and found that the reasoning of Edwards was applicable
in the sixth amendment context because a suspect's need for
counsel is even greater following the suspect's request for counsel
after formal charges have been filed.8 5 The Jackson Court

recognized that the sixth amendment right to counsel should be
afforded at least as much protection as the fifth amendment right
to counsel.8 6 The Court reasoned that the sixth amendment right
to counsel protects the accused at the initiation of adversarial
criminal proceedings; therefore, the suspect must be provided
counsel as a medium between the State and the suspect.8 7
Further, the Court refused to adopt the State's theory that
Jackson's waiver of his Miranda right to counsel during police
interrogation acted as a waiver of Jackson's sixth amendment right
to counsel. 8 The Court indicated that once the suspect invokes
the right to counsel under either the fifth or sixth amendment,
simply readvising the suspect of the Miranda right to counsel and
securing a waiver will not constitute a valid waiver.8 9 Essentially,

at the post-arraignment custodial interrogation. Id at 630-31.
84. Id at 632-33.
85. Id at 631. The Court indicated that the State's argument that the Edwards rule should not
apply to a sixth amendment claim did not appropriately address the "nature of the pretrial protections
afforded by the sixth amendment." Id
86. Id. at 632. The Court reiterated the importance of having the right to rely on counsel after
the initiation of formal charges. Id The Court stated that the importance of the constitutional right
to the assistance of counsel prohibits the police from eliciting information from a suspect even though
the techniques may have been proper had the suspect not invoked the suspect's right to counsel..Id
87. Id See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964)(identifying a constitutional
principle that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel "during perhaps the most critical
period of the proceedings... that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning
of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation [are] vitally important
[to] the defendants").
88. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633. The State contended that the respondents waived their sixth
amendment right to counsel since they made post-arraignment confessions after being advised of their
Mirandarights. Id at 635.
89. Id at 635. The Court concluded that because written waivers are insufficient in a fifth
amendment context, written waivers are insufficient to justify police initiated interrogations after the
request for counsel in a sixth amendment context. Id In order for a waiver to be valid, the suspect
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the Jackson Court adopted the Edwards rule under the sixth
amendment when interrogation occurs after a suspect has invoked
the right to counsel."° Thus, the Jackson Court required a suspect
to reinitiate communication with the police before a valid waiver
of the suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel could be
obtained. 91
The Supreme Court's decision in Jackson was the first case in
which principles underlying the fifth amendment right to counsel
were applied to the sixth amendment. The application of fifth
amendment principles in a sixth amendment context resulted in
confusion among the lower courts as to the scope of protection
provided by each of these amendments. 92 Ultimately adding to
this confusion was the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Arizona v. Roberson.93 Although the Roberson Court decided an
issue solely based on the fifth amendment right to counsel,
Roberson laid the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in
McNeil.
In Roberson, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether the Edwards rule precluded interrogation by police in the
context of an investigation, once the fifth amendment right to

must initiate the questioning prior tb the police securing a waiver. IR at 636.
90. See ia. at 637, 639-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Edwards rule only
provided a second layer of protection to Miranda,and the Jackson decision had cut the Edwardsrule
loose from its "analytical moorings").
91. I /at 635.
92. See infra notes 107-218 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision
in McNeil). Legal scholars have indicated that the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson demonstrates
the doctrinal confusion between the fifth and sixth amendments. Erickson, supra note 42, at 300.
Justice Erickson of the Supreme Court of Colorado indicated that interrogation under the sixth
amendment depends upon whether the police deliberately elicited information from the suspect,
whereas interrogation under the fifth amendment is defined as express questioning or actions
reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. Id As a result, Justice Erickson has stated that the
United States Supreme Court's decisions have lead to uncertainty in the area of fifth and sixth
amendment interrogations and confessions. Id See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420-34
(1986) (analyzing the sixth amendment right to counsel and the Mirandaright to counsel and finding
that the failure to inform a suspect that an attorney had attempted to contact the suspect at the police
station did not invalidate confessions obtained from the defendant).
93. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
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counsel had been invoked for a separate offense.94 In Roberson,
the suspect was arrested at the scene of the crime and was advised

of his Miranda right to counsel.95 Roberson invoked his Miranda
rights stating that he wished to speak with an attorney.9 6 Three
days later, however, Roberson was questioned regarding a separate
offense by a different officer who was unaware Roberson had

previously invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel for the
first offense. 97 During the second interrogation, Roberson made
incriminating statements regarding the first offense to which the
Miranda right to counsel had attached.98

The trial court suppressed the statements elicited from Roberson
during the second interrogation, and on appeal, the Arizona Court
of Appeals affirmed. 99 The State contended that Edwards should
only preclude police questioning regarding the offense for which
the suspect invoked the Miranda right to counsel, and that the

suspect's request for counsel should not apply in the context of a
separate interrogation."

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that once a suspect invokes
the Miranda right to counsel, police interrogation must cease even
though the suspect invokes the right to counsel with respect to a

separate offense.'

The Court based this decision on its prior

94. Id. at 687. See Radek, supra note 35, at 685 (analyzing the Supreme Court's holding in
Roberson and suggesting that the Roberson decision reflects the Court's effort to build on the
Miranda decision rather than undercut Miranda).
95. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678.
96. Id.
97. I1&
98. Id
99. Id. at 678. The Arizona trial court based its decision on the Arizona Supreme Court's
holding in State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 97, 669 P.2d 68, 75 (1983). Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards still applied whether or not the defendant was
interrogated about the same or a different offense. Id. n.2. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 678-79. Because state court decisions
were in conflict, the Supreme Court granted review of the Roberson case in order to provide concrete
guidelines. Id
100. dd at 682.
101. Id. at 687-88. The Supreme Court indicated that the same need to determine whether the
accused has requested counsel exists regardless of who performs the interrogation and whether or not
the interrogation concerns the same or a different offense. Id
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holdings in Miranda and Edwards. " The Court had noted in
Edwards that it would be inconsistent with Miranda if the suspect
could be reinterrogated after the suspect had asserted the right to
counsel, since the suspect had expressed the inability to undergo
police questioning without the presence of counsel."0 3 The
Roberson Court applied the same rationale by stating that it would
be inconsistent with Miranda and Edwards to allow a suspect to be
interrogated4 regarding a separate offense once the suspect invokes
1
Miranda. 0
The Court in Roberson reasoned that if a suspect felt unable to
adequately safeguard the right against self-incrimination during
police interrogation regarding the charged offense, the inability to
safeguard this right would not change if the police questioned the
suspect regarding a separate offense. 1"' Based on this reasoning,
the Court rejected the State's argument that the Edwards rule
should not apply in the context of a separate investigation.0 6 The
Supreme Court's holding in Roberson provided a "bright-line"
rule regarding the scope of protection of the Miranda-Edwards
guarantee once a suspect invokes the fifth amendment right to
counsel. However, when lower courts began applying the Supreme
Court's decision in Roberson and Jackson, confusion arose and the
stage was set for the Court's decision in McNeil.

102. Id. at 680. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text and supra notes 27-43 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda and Edwards, respectively).
103. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)).
104. Id The Court stated that Edwards and Miranda provided unequivocal guidelines to law
enforcement, and the Supreme Court in Roberson desired to maintain these clear and unequivocal
guidelines. Id at 681-82.
105. Id at 681. See W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEl., supra note 23, at 314 (discussing the Roberson
majority's emphasis on the importance of maintaining Edwards as a bright line rule in cases where
the suspect requests an attorney).
106. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682-83. The State attempted to use the Supreme Court's holding
in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975), where the Court had stated that once the suspect

cuts off questioning, the questioning could be resumed after a significant period of time. Mosley, 423
U.S. at 106. The Roberson Court distinguished Mosley since the decision to cut off questioning is
different than requesting an attorney to be present during questioning. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.
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IE. THE CASE
A. Factual and ProceduralHistory
In McNeil v. Wisconsin,1 7 Paul McNeil was arrested in
Omaha, Nebraska in May 1987, pursuant to a warrant charging
McNeil with armed robbery in West Allis, Wisconsin."°8 After
his arrest the police sought to question McNeil, and consequently
advised him of his Miranda rights."° McNeil refused to speak to
the officers but he did not invoke his Miranda right to counsel." 0
McNeil was brought before a Milwaukee County Court
Commissioner where bail was set on the armed robbery charge."'
At the bail hearing, McNeil was accompanied by court appointed
counsel.

112

During that same evening, Detective Butts of the Milwaukee
County Sheriff's Department questioned McNeil regarding offenses
other than the armed robbery charge."' Detective Butts was
investigating an attempted murder and an armed burglary in the
town of Caledonia, Wisconsin."' McNeil waived his Miranda
rights and denied being involved in the Caledonia crimes." 5 Two
days later, McNeil was questioned by the same officer regarding
the Caledonia offenses." 6 Again, McNeil waived his Miranda
rights and signed a waiver form." 7 During this second period of
questioning, McNeil admitted his involvement in the Caledonia

107.
108.
109.
110.
expressly

111 . Ct. 2204 (1991).
Il at 2206.
Ik
Id Although McNeil refused to answer the police officers' questions, McNeil never
stated that he wanted to speak to counsel during his initial confrontation with the police.

Id
111. Id
112. Id McNeil's accompaniment by court appointed counsel triggered the sixth amendment
protection afforded under Massiahand its progeny with respect to the West Allis armed robbery. Id
at 2207. See supra notes 44-106 and accompanying text (illustrating the protection afforded a suspect
by the sixth amendment once the right to counsel has attached).
113. McNeil, 111 S. CL at 2206.
114. Id
115. ld
116. Id
117. Id at 2207.
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crimes and implicated two other men, Willie Pope and Lloyd
Crowley."' Subsequently, McNeil signed a typed document
memorializing the statements made to the police." 9
Pursuant to McNeil's statements, the police questioned Willie
Pope. 2' However, Pope convinced the police that he was not
involved in the Caledonia crimes.'' As a result of Pope's denial,
the police questioned McNeil a third time.'22 Prior to the third
interrogation, McNeil again waived his Miranda rights and signed
another waiver form. 3 During the questioning, McNeil stated
that he had lied about Pope's involvement in the crimes and made
124
other statements implicating himself in the Caledonia crimes.
The following day, McNeil was charged with the Caledonia
offenses." s McNeil's pre-trial motion to suppress the statements
made to the officers was denied. 6 Subsequently, McNeil was
convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison for the Caledonia
12 7

crimes.

McNeil appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals claiming
that his appearance with counsel at the bail hearing for the West
Allis armed robbery invoked his Miranda right to counsel.2 8 As
a result, McNeil contended that his subsequent waiver of Miranda
was invalid, thus rendering inadmissible at trial McNeil's
statements regarding the Caledonia crimes. 2 9 Because it had
never been addressed, the court of appeals certified to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin the issue of whether an accused's request for

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id The questioning was again performed by Detective Butts and Caledonia police officers.

123.

Id

Id
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id McNeil was convicted on charges of second-degree murder, attempted fust-degree
murder, and armed robbery. Id
128. Id
129. Id
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of the
counsel at an initial appearance constitutes an invocation
130
Miranda.
under
counsel
to
right
fifth amendment
The Wisconsin Supreme Court answered in the negative; the
invocation of McNeil's sixth amendment right to counsel did not
constitute an invocation of his fifth amendment right to
Therefore, in the absence of a fifth amendment
counsel.'
invocation, the Edwardsrule did not apply and the police were not
precluded from questioning the defendant.' 32 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized that the Edwards rule applied to both
the fifth and sixth amendment under the Court's decision in
Michigan v. Jackson.133 However, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin contrasted the fifth and sixth amendment, noting that the
sixth amendment does not trigger the Edwards rule with respect to
interrogation regarding uncharged offenses.' The court indicated
that the fifth amendment right to counsel only attaches during
custodial interrogation and does not attend the suspect under all
circumstances. 35 Determining that the Edwards rule does not
affect interrogation on uncharged offenses, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reasoned that the sixth amendment right to counsel had
been invoked for the West Allis crimes but not for the uncharged
Caledonia crimes.' 36 McNeil appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States to determine whether his invocation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel during an initial appearance constituted
with regard to future
an invocation of his Miranda right to counsel
137
police interrogation on uncharged offenses.

130. Id.
131. State v. McNeil, 155 Wis. 2d 24,28-29, 454 N.W.2d 742, 743, cert granted, Ill S. Ct.
340 (1990).
132. 1& at 36, 454 N.W. 2d at 746.
133. Id, at 33-34, 454 N.W. 2d at 745. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text
(discussing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
134. Id at 34, 454 N.W. 2d at 745-46.
135. Id at 36,454 N.W. 2d at 746. Although McNeil was subjected to custodial interrogation,
he waived the right to the presence of counsel. Id at 45, 454 N.W. 2d at 750-51.
136. Id at 36, 454 N.W. 2d at 746.
137. McNeil, 11 S. Ct. at 2207.
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B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court."'8
The majority held that the invocation of the sixth amendment right
to counsel in a judicial proceeding does not automatically invoke
the fifth amendment right to counsel precluding police
interrogation."3 9 In reaching its conclusion, the Court in McNeil
distinguished the fifth and sixth amendments by labeling the sixth
amendment right to counsel as "offense specific" and the fifth
amendment right as "non-offense specific."'"4 Having found the
sixth amendment right to counsel to be offense specific, the
majority conceded that there could have been no further
questioning of McNeil regarding the West Allis armed robbery
without the presence of counsel. 4 ' The McNeil Court stated that
the offense specific nature of the sixth amendment means an
accused cannot invoke sixth amendment protection for all future
prosecutions. 42 Rather, the sixth amendment right to counsel can
only be invoked once an adversarial judicial proceeding has been
initiated.1 43 Applying this analysis to the facts of McNeil, the
majority concluded that since McNeil had not been formally
charged with the Caledonia crimes, he could not invoke his sixth
amendment right to counsel and the statements McNeil made to the

138. I, at 2206. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Souter and O'Connor joined
Justice Scalia in his opinion. Id Justice Kennedy concurred separately. Id at 2211. (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun dissented. Id at 2212. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139.

Id at 2208.

140. Id McNeil is the first Supreme Court decision in which the Court labeled the sixth
amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right to counsel as "offense specific" and
"non-offense specific" respectively. Id The term "offense specific" simply means the sixth
amendment right to counsel only applies to charges formally brought and as a result, any
incriminatory statements made by the suspect regarding other crimes are admissible. Id
141. Id.at 2207. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court's
holding in Michigan v. Jackson that once the right to counsel is invoked, subsequent waivers to
police initiated questioning are invalid).
142. McNeil, 111 S.Ct. at 2207.
143. Id See id (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)) (stating that
adversarial proceeding begins "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedingswhether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment").

1370

1992 / McNeil v. Wisconsin
police regarding the Caledonia offenses were not barred by the
sixth amendment."'
However, the Court recognized that the fifth amendment right
to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona is very different from the
sixth amendment right to counsel.'4 5 Under the Miranda decision,
the Supreme Court developed a number of prophylactic rights
146
designed to protect a suspect during custodial interrogation.
The McNeil Court recognized that Edwards v. Arizona1 47 had
broadened Miranda by adding another prophylactic layer of
protection which requires that once the suspect invokes the
Miranda right to counsel, all questioning must cease and the
suspect may not be approached for further questioning until counsel
has been made available.141 The majority stated that, unlike the
sixth amendment which provides the accused the right to the
presence of counsel during police questioning for the crime
charged, the fifth amendment protection afforded by the Edwards
rule is not offense specific and, once invoked, precludes police
questioning regarding all offenses.'49 Therefore, Justice Scalia's
opinion indicated that once the Miranda right to counsel is

144. Id at 2208. The majority supported its position by citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
179-80 (1985), stating that the failure to allow the police to perform custodial questioning with regard
to other crimes would frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities. McNeil,
111 S. CL at 2208. The Moulton Court illustrated the importance of protecting a suspect's right to
counsel once the sixth amendment is invoked. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178-80. "To allow the admission
of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the
police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement
personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment
right recognized in Massiah." Id at 180. Contrary to this point, the Moulton Court indicated that
evidence for other crimes should not be excluded simply because other charges were pending, as this
would frustrate the police's ability to investigate criminal activity. Id
145. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2208. The Court indicated that the purpose of the sixth amendment
right to counsel was to protect the unaided laymen at trial whereas the fifth amendment right to
counsel provides the assistance of counsel at police custodial interrogation. Id at 2209. The Court
relied on this distinction in its labeling of the sixth amendment as "'offense specific" and the fifth
amendment right to counsel as "non-offense specific". Id at 2208.
146. Id, See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (outlining the prophylactic protections
afforded under the Miranda decision).
147. 451 U.S. 477(1981). See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court of the United States' holding in Edwards).
148. McNeil, Ill 5. Ct. at 2208.
149. Id
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invoked, the suspect may not be questioned regarding any
50
offense. 1
In distinguishing the fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel,
the majority in McNeil discussed the different theories underlying
each right. 15' According to the Court, "[tlhe purpose of the Sixth
Amendment counsel guarantee--and hence the purpose of invoking
it--is to 'protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations'
with his 'expert adversary,' the government, after 'the adverse
positions of government and defendant have solidified' with respect
to a particular alleged crime. ' 152 In contrast, "the purpose of the
Miranda-Edwardsguarantee--and hence the purpose of invoking it-is to protect quite a different interest: the suspect's desire 'to deal
with the police only through counsel."" ' 153 The majority
determined that the Miranda-Edwardsguarantee is broader than the
sixth amendment right to counsel with respect to custodial
interrogation: the Miranda-Edwards guarantee relates to
questioning regarding any suspected crime regardless of whether an
adversary proceeding has been instituted for that crime.'54
However, in another respect the fifth amendment right is narrower
than the sixth amendment right because the Miranda right only
155
applies to custodial interrogation.
Justice Scalia's opinion stated that invoking the sixth
amendment right to counsel does not invoke the Miranda-Edwards
interest.15 The majority indicated that a suspect who has invoked
the sixth amendment right to counsel may be willing to discuss
various matters with the police without the assistance of
counsel.' 57 However, if the subject of police questioning is the

150. Id Any statement obtained by an officer after the suspect invokes the Miranda right to
counsel will be held to be inadmissable even if the suspect executes a waiver. Id. The Court deemed
the statements inadmissable in order to prevent "police from badgering a defendant into waiving his
previously asserted Miranda rights." Id. (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).
151. McNeil, III S.Ct. at 2208-09.
152. Id. (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
153. Id at 2209 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
154. 1d
155. Id
156. Id.
157. l
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matter under prosecution, the suspect may not be willing to speak
to the police.'5s The Court premised this distinction on the
rationale that the suspect's invocation of the fifth amendment right
to counsel indicates a belief that the suspect is unable to deal with
regarding any offense without the presence of
police interrogation
1 59
counsel.
Contrary to its position on the fifth amendment right to counsel,
the majority concluded that a suspect's request for the assistance
of counsel at adversarial proceedings under the sixth amendment
is no indication that the suspect desires counsel to be present
during police questioning regarding other affairs." 6 In order for
the Edwards rule to apply, a suspect must expressly ask for the
assistance of counsel during police custodial interrogation.' 6' As
a result, the Court stated that the request for counsel at a bail
hearing does not constitute a request for the presence of counsel
during custodial interrogation. 62
The McNeil majority indicated that the Supreme Court's
holding in Michigan v. Jackson also supports the fifth and sixth
amendment distinction.'63 Jackson held that the invocation of the
right to counsel under the sixth amendment precludes the admission
of subsequent police initiated custodial questioning.' 64 The
McNeil Court emphasized that the holding in Jackson rejects the
158. Id The Court noted that suspects are often willing to speak to officers outside an
adversarial setting since suspects often feel that, by suggesting their innocence through unassisted and
open conversation with the authorities, they can avoid having the State bring additional charges. Id
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Id The majority stated that the right to counsel must be asserted when "'the government
seeks to take the action they protect against." Id. at 2211 n.3. The majority also indicated that the
Court has never allowed a suspect to invoke the Mirandaright to counsel outside of custodial
interrogation. Id
162. Id at 2209. In order for the Edwards-Mirandarule to apply, the suspect must express a
desire for the assistance of counsel during interrogation by police. Id. However, merely requesting
an attorney during a bail hearing will not satisfy this requirement because of the absence of police
custodial interrogation. Id The majority stated: "Assuming, however, that an assertion at arraignment
would be effective, and would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle of our
decisions will not have substantial consequences is no reason to abandon the principle." Id. at 2211
n.3.
163. Id. at 2209. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
164. Jackson,475 U.S. at 635. See McNeil, IIl S. Ct. at 2209 (reiterating the Jacksonholding).
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contention that the invocation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel also triggers the Edwards guarantee.1 6 When a suspect
invokes the sixth amendment right to counsel, the suspect is not
expressing the desire to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation. 16' If the foregoing contention were true, then the
Court would not have had to create a new test in Jackson. 67
Instead, the suspect would merely have to invoke the MirandaEdwards guarantee to the right to counsel during police-custodial
interrogation.168 As a result, the police officers would be entirely
precluded from questioning the suspect
regarding any offense
69
because of the invocation of Edwards.1
The majority also examined whether, as a matter of policy, the
invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel should invoke
the Miranda right to counsel. 171 In weighing this policy
consideration, Justice Scalia intimated that the Court may not be
empowered under the Constitution to find that an assertion of the
sixth amendment right to counsel impliedly invokes the Miranda
right to counsel."' Furthermore, assuming the Court did have the
power, Justice Scalia stated that exercising such power would be
unwise." The majority indicated that if the suspect does not
wish to speak to the authorities without the presence of counsel, the
suspect should request the presence of counsel once the police read
the suspect the Miranda rights.'73 Moreover, the majority
determined that the effectiveness of law enforcement would be
impeded if the Supreme Court were to hold that invoking the sixth
amendment right to counsel also includes an assertion of the
Miranda right to counsel. 74 In turn, the Court stated, suspects in

165.
166.
167.

Id at 2209-10.
Id
Id at 2210. The test created in Jackson was that a the court must f'id that the "Edwards

rule- is satisfied before a suspect may be questioned by police officers. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
168. McNeiI 111 S. Ct. at 2210.
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Id
172. Id
173. Id

174. Id
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custody would be unapproachable by the police if the police
wanted to question a suspect regarding other crimes. 75 The
McNeil majority concluded that admissions of guilt under a waiver
to society's interest in punishing those
of Miranda are essential
76
law.
the
who violate
The McNeil Court was unwilling to rule in favor of the
defendant in order to provide police with a "clear and
unequivocal" guideline as urged by McNeil. 177 Instead, the
majority reasoned that if the police desire clear and unequivocal
guidelines, the police should adopt a policy of not questioning 7a
suspect in custody once the suspect has requested counsel. 1
Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that adopting such a rule would not
be consistent with the fifth and sixth amendments and would do
more harm than good. 179 The Court declined to adopt a bright
line rule, and held that the invocation of the sixth amendment right
to counsel does not automatically invoke the suspect's Miranda
right to counsel.'
C. ConcurringOpinion by Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy wrote a brief concurring opinion joining the
majority opinion in all respects. 181 Contrary to the majority,
Justice Kennedy proffered that the petitioner could have been
questioned regarding the Caledonia crimes even if his fifth
amendment right to counsel regarding the West Allis armed
robbery had been invoked. 8 2 By characterizing the protection

175. 1d&
176. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
177. Id. at 2211.
178. Id. Although, the Court stated it prefers clear and unequivocal judicial guidelines, the
majority emphasized that such rules should only be established if they "guide sensibly and in a
direction [the Court is] authorized to go." Id.

179.

Id

180.

Id.

181. Id at 2211 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). In contrast, the majority indicated that Edwardswould have
precluded the police from questioning McNeil regarding the Caledonia crimes. Compare id at 2211
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring) with i. at 2208 (Justice Kennedy calling for the alignment of the fifth and
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By characterizing the protection afforded under the Supreme
Court's decision in Edwards as "extraordinary," Justice Kennedy
suggested limiting Edwards to a particular investigation." 3
Justice Kennedy advocated that restricting the guarantee under
Edwards to a particular investigation would not increase the
number of instances where confessions were obtained through
wearing down the will of the suspect." 4 Justice Kennedy
indicated a need for alignment between the fifth and sixth
amendment in order to give uniform and workable guidelines to the
criminal justice system." 5

sixth amendment while the majority in McNeil labeled the fifth amendment as "non-offense specific"
and the sixth amendment as "offense specific").
183. Id. at 2211 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Compare McNeil v. Wisconsin, I11 S. Ct. 2204,
2211 (1991) with Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1988) (concurring in McNeil and
dissenting in Roberson, Justice Kennedy maintains that the Edwardsrule should not be extended to
include separate and independent investigations). In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
and not a "constitutional
Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, in Roberson, identified Edwards as a "'rule'"
command." Roberson, 486 U.S. at 688 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated the
majority's holding in Roberson, that the Miranda-Edwardsprotection extends to all custodial
interrogations by police officers once the fifth amendment right to counsel is invoked, does not
protect the rights of suspects and serves only to frustrate police investigative efforts. Id. at 688-89
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). In the Roberson dissent, Justice Kennedy described the extension of
Edwards to separate investigations as "'unwarranted." Id. at 689 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy
indicated that the Edwards rule "was in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused
in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in
Edwards was." I& at 690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1044 (1983)). Justice Kennedy stated that there is little chance of badgering a suspect into submission
when the custodial interrogation concerns a separate offense. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 690 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). "Unless there are so many separate investigations that fresh teams of police are
regularly turning up to question the suspect, the danger of badgering is minimal, and insufficient to
justify a rigid per se rule." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Although the majority in Roberson argued
that a suspect may believe his right to counsel is "fictitious" if the suspect is required to assert the
Miranda right to counsel a second time, Justice Kennedy deemed this argument ineffectual. Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). "The suspect, having observed that his earlier invocation of rights was
effective in terminating questioning and having been advised that further questioning may not relate
to that crime, would understand that he may invoke his rights again with respect to the new
investigation, and so terminate questioning regarding that investigation as well." Id. at 690-91
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. McNeil, 11 S. Ct. at 2211 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. Id. (Kennedy, I., concurring). Justice Kennedy called for the alignment of the fifth and
sixth amendment, whereas the majority clearly indicated that the sixth amendment is "offense
specific" and the fifth amendment is "non-offense specific." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, challenged the majority's characterization
' 18 6
of the sixth amendment right to counsel as "offense specific.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's offense specific
characterization of the sixth amendment because the dissent was

concerned that such characterization would generate confusion in
the law regarding the attorney-client privilege.'8 7 Moreover, the

dissent stated that the majority's decision reflected a preference for
an inquisitorial system of justice rather than an adversarial system,
since the majority viewed the defense attorney as an impediment
in the legal system.' 88
The dissent posited that if McNeil had invoked his fifth
amendment right to counsel under Miranda in dealing with
custodial interrogation, the majority's characterization of the sixth
amendment as offense specific would collapse."8 9 The dissent
asserted that the basis of the majority's decision was that McNeil
failed to make a statement at the preliminary hearing which

expressed his desire to have an attorney present during custodial
interrogation." The dissent predicted that competent defense
counsel will automatically invoke the fifth amendment right to
counsel in order to obviate the holding in McNeil since invoking
Miranda at the initial court hearing will prevent the very

186. Ia at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority stated that the presence of counsel does not
make a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial. Id at 2210 n.2. Rather, the presence of the judge
deciding a case based on the arguments presented by both parties is representative of an adversarial
system. Id The majority indicated that the criminal justice system "has always been inquisitorial at
the investigative stage." Id,
189. Id at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority indicated that the Supreme Court has
never held that the Miranda right to counsel can be anticipatorily invoked. Id at 2211 n.3. The
majority proposed that allowing a suspect to anticipatorily invoke the Mirandaright to counsel would
enable the suspect to invoke the right to counsel by a letter prior to arrest. Id However, the majority
argued that the mere fact that an assertion of the Miranda right to counsel prevents future
interrogation does not mean that a suspect can anticipatorily invoke this right outside of custodial
interrogation. Id
190. Id at 2212 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
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questioning which occurred in McNeil. 9 ' As a result, the dissent
argued that the McNeil holding would have little effect on police
practices since the majority's holding can be circumvented."9
The dissent also attacked the majority's decision as being
contrary to case precedent. 93 Justice Stevens interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Jackson'94 as holding
that the request for counsel should be treated broadly in favor of
the constitutional right, and held that the invocation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel constitutes an invocation of right to
counsel at police-initiated interrogation.195 Instead, the dissent
asserted that the majority took a narrow view in McNeil by
construing that ambiguous requests for counsel will not invoke the
fifth amendment right to counsel.' 96
In addition, the dissent noted that, while judges and lawyers
may understand the differences between the fifth and sixth
amendments, the layman does not. 97 The dissent indicated that
a suspect would not know that invoking the right to counsel under
the sixth amendment at an initial appearance would only apply to
the offense charged and not to questions regarding any other
offense.'98 The McNeil dissent contended that the accused's
request for an attorney under the sixth amendment reflects the

191. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that counsel for the defendant will merely
have to invoke the right to counsel for all police interrogations as a matter of practice. 1i (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel regarding custodial interrogation, the
police will be unable to interrogate the suspect until counsel is provided. I, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority indicated that "'assurming ... that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and
would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle or our decisions will not have
substantial consequences is no reason to abandon that principle." Id. at 2211 n.3. The majority
concluded by stating that it would be intolerable to make a suspect unapproachable even when the
suspect has not objected to custodial interrogation. Id.
192. Id at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Jackson).
195. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625 (1986)). The dissent maintained if there are doubts as to whether the suspect made a valid waiver
of his rights, then a court should give deference to the defendant in order to protect the constitutional
rights of the suspect. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633 n.7).
198. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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belief that the suspect cannot deal with adversaries alone.'
Therefore, the suspect's invocation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel should constitute an invocation of the fifth amendment
right to counsel."oe
The dissent in McNeil also attacked the characterization of the
sixth amendment right to counsel as "offense specific. ' 201 The
dissent asserted that this characterization ignores the foundations of
the broadly construed attorney-client privilege through narrowly
construing the sixth amendment right to counsel.2 1 Justice
Stevens indicated that the scope of the attorney-client privilege is
"as broad as the subject matter that might reasonably be
encompassed by negotiations for a plea bargain or the contents of
a presentence investigation report." 2 3 By narrowing the sixth
amendment to apply only to the crime charged, the dissent argued
that the majority holding is "unrealistic and invidious. ' ' 204
In addition, the dissent expressed concern over the possible
confusion which may result from the majority's holding in
McNeil.20 The dissent argued that, in order to analyze the legal
issues, the majority assumed that the police questioning regarding
the Caledonia crimes was unrelated to the investigation of the West
Allis charge. 206 The dissent was concerned that, by making this
assumption, the majority had given no guidelines to the lower
courts regarding the boundaries of the offense specific

199. Id(Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the majority's view that a suspect's
request for counsel to defend against a particular charge implies that the suspect wishes to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation for only that particular charge. Id4at 2213 (Stevens,
J.,
dissenting). The dissent suggested that the request for counsel does not mean that the suspect does
not wish to have counsel present for interrogation on other charges. Id (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
200. 1Id(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
201. Id4(Stevens, 1, dissenting).
202. Id (Stevens, 3., dissenting). Traditionally, the scope of the attorney-client privilege has
been very broad; therefore, a narrow construction of when the suspect will be afforded the right to
counsel is improper. Id (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
203. Id (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
204. Id (Stevens, J.,dissenting). The dissent found this narrow view of the attorney-client
privilege improper, particularly because McNeil was offered favorable treatment. Id (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
205. Id at 2214 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
206.

Id (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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limitation. 7 The McNeil dissent deemed that the majority
decision would encourage police subjectivity regarding which
charges may be brought against a suspect.2"8 The dissent posited
that the police will be selective about which charges are brought so
that they may preserve the opportunity of interrogating the suspect
on other charges."M The dissent asserted that the majority
decision will dim the bright-line tests espoused in Edwards and
Jackson since the McNeil majority failed to outline the boundaries
210
of the offense specific limitation.
Finally, according to the dissent, the majority's fears of
impeding police investigations were unfounded . 2z1 The dissent
stated that the majority's holding will affect very few cases.212
Observing that a contrary holding would not make police
interrogation of suspects impossible, the dissent contended that a
contrary holding would ensure that the suspect's statements were
voluntary, as a valid waiver would be required before police could
interrogate the suspect. 213 Also, the dissent indicated that a
contrary rule would be consistent with the adversarial nature of the
justice system.21 4 The dissent posited that the adversarial system
can only function effectively if the adversaries communicate

207. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. I. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supranotes 27-43 and accompanying text (describing the
bright-line rule provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards); supra notes 73-91 and
accompanying text (illustrating theJackson Court's desire to provide clear and unequivocal guidelines
to law enforcement as in Miranda and Edwards).
211. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 219-231 and accompanying text (discussing
the methods of circumventing the majority's opinion in McNeil).
213. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2214 (Stevens, ., dissenting). The dissent noted that prior decisions
have been concerned with protecting individuals in the context ofcustodial interrogation. Id (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the majority abandoned the position that an adversarial
system of justice can function effectively only when the opposing parties communicate with one
another through counsel in order to protect laypersons from more skillful and experienced
professionals. Id at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to Mirandav. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436,447 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 476,484 (1981), Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 681 (1988), and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 (1975) to support the position that
counsel is necessary in order to protect suspects during custodial interrogation. Id at 2212 (Stevens,
., dissenting).
214. Id at 2214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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through counsel." 5 Therefore, allowing laypersons to be
questioned by experts without the assistance of counsel would
create an inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, system.216 The
dissent concluded that the majority's holding failed to recognize the
lawyer as an aid to the understanding of constitutional rights.2 17
Rather, the dissent attacked the majority as viewing the lawyer as
a obstacle to the prosecution of criminals.2" 8
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Is McNeil an Empty Decision or a Sleeping Giant?
Justice Stevens' dissent in McNeil suggested that the McNeil
decision may have little effect on future cases.2" The dissent
indicated that once the suspect has requested counsel under the
sixth amendment, as a matter of routine, competent defense
attorneys will merely advise the accused to invoke the Miranda
right to counsel regarding future police interrogation. 220 As a
result, the defense can virtually nullify the Court's decision in
McNeil and frustrate the underlying rationale of the majority's
22
decision. '
A primary concern of the McNeil majority was to avoid
impeding the effectiveness of the police by making suspects
unapproachable regarding other crimes.222 However, the nature of
the decision in McNeil could result in the resurfacing of these
concerns. Since defense counsel can circumvent the offense specific
classification of the sixth amendment merely by having the suspect

215. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the view taken by the majority will not
prevent the danger of compulsion during interrogation. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id at 2210. The majority attempted to alleviate this concern through holding that a
suspect's invocation of his sixth amendment right to counsel did not constitute an invocation of the
Miranda right to counsel. Id.
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invoke the Mirandaright to counsel, the police would be precluded
from questioning the subject regarding any offense. 223 As a result,
the Supreme Court's decision in McNeil may require the Court to
revisit McNeil as well as other decisions in the Miranda
progeny.' 4 If a standard practice of invoking the fifth
amendment right to counsel develops as a result of McNeil, two
possible courses of action can be taken by the Supreme Court to
preserve the holding in McNeil.
First, the Supreme Court may refuse to recognize a suspect's
ability to anticipatorily invoke the Miranda right to counsel. The
majority alluded that a preliminary hearing would not amount to
custodial interrogation enabling the suspect to invoke the fifth
amendment right to counsel.2' Logically, if a suspect could
invoke the fifth amendment right to counsel during a preliminary
hearing and in the absence of custodial interrogation, a suspect
could invoke the right to counsel in a multitude of settings where
custodial interrogation is not present.2 6 By requiring the presence
of custodial interrogation for a suspect to invoke the Miranda right
to counsel, the Supreme Court can preserve the holding in McNeil
without affecting prior case precedent.
Secondly, the Court could preserve the holding in McNeil while
protecting police custodial interrogation in the McNeil context
through redefining principles announced in past fifth amendment
case precedent. A natural progression of the Supreme Court would

223. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court's holding in
Edwards requires the police to cease all questioning once the Miranda right to counsel is invoked

unless the suspect initiates the questioning).
224. The final paragraph of the majority opinion in McNeil stated: "The Court is forever
adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added. We decline to add another story to Miranda." McNeil, 111 S.
CL at 2211. Although the Supreme Court has noted its reluctance to expand on the Miranda decision,
the Court may have to address decisions in the Miranda progeny in order to clarify the decision in
McNeil.
225. McNeil, III S.Ct. at 2211 n.3. The Court indicated that it had never held that Miranda

may be anicipatorily invoked. a
226. IdL If a suspect can invoke Miranda during a preliminary hearing where custodial
interrogation is absent, the majority argued that there is no logical reason why a suspect could not
invoke the Miranda right to counsel by letter and prior to arrest. Id
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be to narrow the holding in Edwards or to overrule Edwards
entirely.
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion called for an
"aligning" of the fifth and the sixth amendments.227 Justice
Kennedy proposed limiting the Edwards decision to a particular
investigation.22 In other words, Justice Kennedy would make the
fifth amendment Miranda right "offeitse specific.'"2 9 If the
Court were to adopt Justice Kennedy's view, the suspect's request
for the fifth amendment right to counsel under Mirandawould only
apply to the case presently charged. The invocation of the fifth
amendment right to counsel would have no effect, since its
protection would merely overlap the protection already afforded
under the sixth amendment right to counsel." Preserving the
Supreme Court's holding in McNeil through the -alignment of the
fifth and sixth amendments would be at the expense of narrowing
Edwards and overruling Arizona v. Roberson.23 '
In the event the practice of anticipatorily invoking the fifth
amendment right to counsel is utilized by defense counsel in order
to circumvent McNeil, the Supreme Court could address the
problems created by this practice through the approaches mentioned
above. Although the previously suggested approaches are not
inclusive, each approach would preserve the McNeil Court's
holding. If the Supreme Court failed to take such action, the effect
of the McNeil Court's characterization of the fifth and sixth
amendments as "non-offense specific" and "offense specific,"
respectively, would be greatly curtailed.

227. See supranotes 181-185 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in McNeil).
228. McNeil, I11 S.Ct. at2211 (Kennedy, L, concurring).
229. Id See supranotes 183-185 and accompanying text (illustrating Justice Kennedy's desire
to align the fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel).
230. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2211 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 181-185 and
accompanying text (addressing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in McNeil).
231. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court's holding
in Roberson).
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B. The Open Question After McNeil: When Does the Request for
Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment Encompass a Crime Not
Formally Charged?
The majority in McNeil held that the invocation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel did not act as an invocation of the fifth
amendment right to counsel for an unrelated charge.232 The
dissent criticized the majority's finding that custodial interrogation
relating to the Caledonia offenses was a separate offense from the
West Allis crimes for which the sixth amendment right to counsel
had been invoked.233 The McNeil dissent indicated that the
investigations of both the West Allis crimes and the Caledonia
crimes were concurrent and the investigations were performed by
the same state officials.234 This poses a problem for future cases,
similar to McNeil, where the crime to which the sixth amendment
right to counsel has attached is sufficiently related to the other
crimes about which the suspect was interrogated by the police. The
Supreme Court may be called to formulate a test to determine
when a case is sufficiently related to a crime charged, thus enabling
the invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel to protect
the suspect in subsequent police interrogation regarding related
charges. No Supreme Court decision has developed a test for
determining the degree of relation necessary for such a
determination. However, state court and lower federal court
decisions have addressed this issue in similar cases.235
People v. Michael B., 236 a California Court of Appeal case
decided prior to McNeil and having a similar fact pattern to
McNeil, created a test which could be adopted by the Supreme

232. McNeil, 1III. Ct. at 2209.
233. Id at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that McNeil could not have known
that the invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel was restricted only to the West Allis
crimes. Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id at 2207. The majority did not address the degree of relation needed before a suspect's
request for counsel will protect the suspect during subsequent police interrogation. Id
236. 125 Cal. App. 3d 790, 178 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1981).
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Court to answer the open question in McNeil.237 In Michael B.,
the defendant had been arrested and formally charged for one
burglary, however, the police continued investigating two related
burglaries."' After reading the suspect his Miranda rights and
securing a waiver, the police obtained a confession from the
suspect, without the presence of counsel, regarding the charged
burglary and the two uncharged burglaries. 239 Deciding the case
strictly in a sixth amendment context, the court of appeal was
confronted with the issue of whether the crimes were so
inextricably intermeshed that the invocation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel for the first burglary charge precluded police
initiated questioning regarding the other burglaries."
In order to determine if the crimes were sufficiently related, the
court of appeal in Michael B. examined four factors: (1) The
proximity of the crimes; (2) discrepancies in the seriousness of the
offenses; (3) the likelihood that the same attorney would represent
the suspect on each of the crimes; and (4) whether the suspect was
read and voluntarily waived the Miranda right to counsel. 241
After reviewing these factors, the court of appeal held that the
crimes were not so "inextricably intermeshed" that making a
factual and conceptual distinction between the crimes was
impossible or that the police interrogation on one crime affected
the representation of the suspect on the other crime.242 Although

237. d. at 792-93, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. A minor was arrested and charged with one count
of burglary. Il at 793, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The minor was accompanied by court appointed
counsel at his detention hearing. IcL While in custody following his detention hearing, Michael was
questioned by a police officer who administered full Miranda warnings to Michael and also asked
Michael if he desired to have his father or his probation officer present. Id, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
Michael agreed to speak to the police officer and declined to have his father or probation officer
present during questioning. Id Michael was interrogated by the police officer regarding two
burglaries which had occurred in the same neighborhood as the burglary with which Michael had
been charged. Id
238. Id at 792-93, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. Three burglaries had occurred in the same
neighborhood within a six day period and although the defendant was formally charged with only
one of the burglaries, the defendant remained a suspect in the other burglaries. Id
239. Id. at 793, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
240. Id at 797, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96. The case was strictly decided under the sixth
amendment because there was no claim that the fifth amendment right to counsel was also invoked.
241. Id at 795, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
242. Id at 797-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
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the California Court of Appeal decided Michael B. solely in a sixth
amendment context, the Michael B. factors could be adopted by the
United States Supreme Court to ascertain whether crimes are
sufficiently related to enable a suspect to claim that the sixth
amendment right to counsel would protect the suspect for the other
offense to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not
attached.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a similar test in
United States v. Cooper.243 In Cooper, the defendant claimed that
the invocation of the sixth amendment right to counsel on an
aggravated robbery charge precluded the police from questioning
the defendant on a charge of illegally possessing firearms. 2 " The
factors examined by the Fifth Circuit in Cooper included: (1) The
similarities in the crimes; (2) the temporal proximity of the crimes;
(3) whether the same victims were involved; and (4) whether the
sovereign was the same.245 The Cooper Court held that the
crimes concerned different conduct and although much of the same
evidence could be used in both crimes, the statements should be
allowed in evidence.246
Factors from both Michael B.247 and Cooper248 could be
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in formulating a test
to determine the degree of relation of crimes. The Court could look
to the similarity of the crimes, the degree in severity of the crimes,
whether the same victims were involved, the temporal proximity of
the crimes and whether the same attorney would be likely to
represent the suspect on each of the crimes. These factors would
give the Supreme Court sufficient latitude to determine whether a
suspect would expect the invocation of the sixth amendment right

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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to counsel to protect the suspect from subsequent questioning on
other related charges.249
C. Does McNeil Make Sense to the Layman?
Finally, it should be noted that the McNeil Court's decision has
created a distinction between the fifth and sixth amendments which
may not be understood by the average citizen." Labelling the
sixth amendment as "offense specific" and the fifth amendment as
"non-offense specific" is unlikely to make much sense to the
layman. In fact, the dissent in McNeil emphasized that judges and
lawyers may understand the subtle distinctions of the fifth and sixth
amendment but an average citizen may not. 25 '
Scholars indicate that Miranda has had little effect on
conviction rates since most suspects do not understand that the
purpose of police questioning is to gather evidence in order to
convict the suspect.1 2 It stands to reason that a suspect may not
fully appreciate that there are two different contexts in which the
right to counsel may be invoked. Until the Supreme Court clarifies
the distinctions between the fifth and sixth amendment, suspects are
unlikely to realize the scope of the right to counsel protection
provided under both the fifth and sixth amendments and, therefore,
suspects may be prevented from taking full advantage of these
constitutional protections.

249. Analyzing the facts in McNeil, under this proposed test is unnecessary as the crimes are
substantially different.
250. In a nation where nearly half of the citizens do not know why the Constitution was drafted
and only 45 per cent of the citizens know that Miranda dealt with rights of criminal suspects, subtle
distinctions between the fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel are unlikely to be understood by
the layman. Marcotte, We the People... Don't Know the Constitution,According to a New Survey,
73 A.B.A. J. 20, 20-21 (May 1987).
251. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 421 Mich. 39, 63-64. 365
N.W.2d 56, 67 (1986)).
252. See W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 23, § 6.5, at 286 (discussing misconceptions of
suspects regarding the purpose of Miranda and police interrogation).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The McNeil case clearly illustrates the complexity of defining
a suspect's right to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments.
The presence of both these rights within a single context has
further exacerbated the Supreme Court's attempt to outline the
scope of protection provided by each right to counsel. The holding
in McNeil, that a suspect's invocation of the sixth amendment right
to counsel does not act as an invocation of the fifth amendment
right to counsel, was an attempt by the Supreme Court to develop
clear and concise guidelines regarding the scope of protection
afforded by the fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel.
Unfortunately, although the McNeil Court's attempt to clarify the
sixth amendment right to counsel and the derivative right to
counsel under the fifth amendment may provide clear guidelines to
lawyers and judges, the decision may not be as clear to a suspect
who is intended to benefit from these protections.
Robert B. Robards
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